Notes

¹ Some philosophers simply assume that externalism can be extended to memory-contents, e.g., Ludlow 1995, Lycan 1996b. For the opposing view, see, e.g., Boghossian 1989; also Boghossian 1994.

² Here I have in mind inverted qualia arguments, especially the Inverted Earth objection pressed by Block (see his 1990, 1996). For a reply to Block that appeals in part to an externalist account of memory, see Lycan 1996b. See also here Tye forthcoming. Phenomenal externalism is elaborated and defended by Dretske (1995), myself (1995), and Lycan (1996a).

³ With one minor qualification to be explained later.

⁴ This is, of course, fully consistent with content-externalism. For the externalist who individuates content in a fine-grained way, there are two factors that enter into content: the worldly entities to which the relevant concepts refer (e.g., the orator, Cicero) and the modes of presentation. The content as a whole—what the given individual thinks, believes etc—rationalizes behavior (itself partly externally individuated). For more on two-factor theories of content, see Mclaughlin and Tye (forthcoming (a)).

⁵ In Putnam's original version of the tale, Twin-Earth is an actual planet in another part of our galaxy.

⁶ My comment “Water is improved by mixing it with gin” is tenseless.

⁷ To see this, suppose that instead of uttering the sentences mentioned earlier in the text, I am reading the sentences, “There is plenty of water around now. Water used to be in short supply, however. Unlike now, water in those days was a precious commodity.” Suppose also that I am somewhat dubious about the veracity of their author, and I neither assent to nor dissent from what I am reading. The earlier points now go through for the case of thought rather than belief.

⁸ I concede that it would certainly be very counter-intuitive, indeed obviously mistaken, for the externalist to claim that in the above example, I remember that twater was not the only thing I used to drink before 5 pm, where the term 'remember' is being used as a success verb. But that, of course, is not the externalist's position.

⁹ The clause “provided that I am able to exercise the normal human capacity to have beliefs about the contents of my occurrent memories” is intended to exclude cases in which I lack the capacity in question (e.g., due to impairments in attention) as well as cases in which I have the capacity but I am somehow blocked from exercising it (as, e.g., when I am radically dissociated from the contents of my occurrent memories).

¹⁰ Here I am only considering propositional memories. For some comments on privileged access and memory images, see Section IV. For a precise statement of the privileged access thesis as well as extended defenses of content-externalism against the charge that it is incompatible with privileged access, see McLaughlin and Tye (forthcoming (a) and (b)).

¹¹ Trouble arises for the thesis only if it is generalized to any two thoughts or beliefs, past or present. Other objections of which I am aware (e.g., those leveled by Falvey and Owens (1994)) seem to me unsuccessful. See Mclaughlin and Tye (forthcoming (a)).

¹² As noted earlier, the case of memory images or impressions is taken up in Section IV.

¹³ The term 'deferential' is Brian Loar's, not Burge's. See Loar 1990.

¹⁴ This example (which is due to Brian McLaughlin) is taken from McLaughlin and Tye

¹⁵ It is sometimes supposed that beliefs like those of Tom and Twin-Tom in this example have metalinguistic contents. Tom's belief is about the English words 'soundness' and 'validity'; Twin-Tom's is about the corresponding Twin-English words. This is not what the translation test suggests, however. If we translate Twin-Tom's remark into English, intuitively no Twin-English remains. Moreover, were Twin-Tom, in making his reply, really expressing his belief that an argument is correctly called 'sound' in Twin-English if and only if were all its premises true, its conclusion would be; and an argument is correctly called 'valid' in Twin-English if and only if it is correctly called 'sound' and all of its premisses are true, then he would be misreporting or misexpressing his psychological state. For he does not mention the Twin-English words 'soundness' and 'validity' in the remark that he makes. And if he is misexpressing the real content of his belief, then it seems to follow that he does not properly grasp what he believes. So, the metalinguistic construal of the content of Twin-Tom's belief seems to imply that Twin-Tom lacks privileged access to what he believes in this case. That is very counter-intuitive.

¹⁶ This mismemory is propositional. Tom's memory inage is similar to the auditory experience he used to have in hearing his teacher utter the words, “Once again, your argument is not valid.” At this phenomenal level, there is no inaccuracy.

¹⁷ Of course, in this case, I would have been disposed to produce different verbal behavior in taking the temr 'wasp' to mean large, black, stinging insect rather than yellow-jacket. So,as it stands, the example does not directly support externalism (and hence it is, in this respect, unlike the one involving validity and soundness).

¹⁸ Burge himself (in his 1988, p. 659), suggests that externalism extends to memory-contents, but he does not develop the suggestion.

¹⁹ This worry seems to lie behind remarks both Block (1996) and Shoemaker (forthcoming) make about the case of travelling to Inverted Earth.

²⁰ At any rate, the externalist I shall be considering is so committed. One who holds that memory-contents are fixed by factors in the past environment is also an externalist albeit of a much weaker sort.

²¹ Peter Ludlow (1995) offers a defense of externalism in which he seems to deny this claim.

²² For more on transparency, see Harman 1990, Tye 1991, 1995.

²³ See Reisberg 1987. Other pairs of faces Reisberg chose included Groucho Marx and Laurence Olivier, Humphrey Bogart and Burt Reynolds, Candice Bergen and Marilyn Monroe. Subjects were asked questions such as the following: Who has the longer face (relative to width)? Who has more closely set eyes? Who has a broader nose? Who has a more pointed chin? Who has a higher forehead? Who has bushier eyebrows?

²⁴ There are many other experiments that strongly suggest that visual images are not photographic but rather are constructed piecemeal with the aid of concept driven processes. See Tye (1993); also Block (1983).

²⁵ A case of this sort (involving Pavarotti) is presented in Boghossian 1994.

²⁶ Even though I believe that Twin-Thatcher was doing the sun-bathing, given that my memory image is of the earthly Thatcher, I believe of her (Thatcher)—in the de re sense of 'of'—that she was sun-bathing. No difficulty arises here. For I believe falsely that that person (the one I am imaging) is Twin-Thatcher.

²⁷ The fact that privileged access fails with respect to what such images are of should cause no-one any real concern. After all, it fails for the counterpart cases of seeing. For example, I can believe that I am seeing Jones even though I am really seeing Smith. On any careful statement of the privileged access thesis, these cases will be excluded anyway.

²⁸ This sense of 'of' corresponds to the sense of 'about' in which some beliefs are about Santa Claus or about unicorns. Such beliefs are ones that exercise the concept Santa Claus or the concept unicorn.

²⁹ Cp. Tienson (1987).

³⁰ An earlier version of this paper was read at King's College, London. I am grateful to Mark Sainsbury, Gabriel Segal, and Barry Smith for helpful comments.